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HEADWINDS CONFRONTING THE SEC
BY JAMES D. Cox*

James D. Cox discusses his concerns for the future of the SEC
in the wake of the financial crisis. He fears decreased resource
allocation from the government to the SEC in the future, the
development of a political climate that is averse to SEC regulation, and
increased second-guessing by the judiciary of SEC regulation. He also
notes how recent congressional deregulation has changed the
landscape of SEC regulatory activities, and discusses the current state
of SEC enforcement authority.
I will address a series of exogenous events that I fear will
adversely affect the SEC. My fears are on several levels. Least
important is the fear that without an SEC there likely would be little
demand for our securities regulation casebook, so crass personal interest
has only a minor role to play here. A larger and likely more legitimate
concern is that the events I describe will cause the SEC to be much less
vibrant, indeed even fundamentally marginalized.
There is no doubt in my mind that the SEC's importance has
been diminished already by the financial crisis. Thus, I worry about the
following series of exogenous events taking it over the cliff. Some of
the forces that could overtake the SEC are beyond its control. Foremost
is the nature of the risks that threaten our financial system. When the
next financial blow-up happens it is not going to be because of
something that fits within the realm of securities regulation. If you are a
congressman, a policy maker, or president of the United States and you
reflect on what threatens the U.S. and global financial systems, what
you fear likely are not activities or phenomena neatly within the SEC's
regulatory turf It is something that falls within the jurisdiction of some
other regulatory agency, most likely in the banking area. If this is
correct, then we would expect greater resources to be allocated to those
regulators than to the SEC. Thus, how the threat to the financial system
is perceived implicates potential marginalization of the SEC.
* Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
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As we move into a new realm in which markets fold together
and financial products do not fit into one agency's bailiwick or another,
it is probably a good time to stand back-as occurred in the early 1960s
when the SEC was also facing marginalization-and take a look at what
really is happening in markets and look at the unique skill package that
the SEC possesses or could develop that would address some of these
concerns. The 1963 SEC Special Study' was based on a small
appropriation ($5.3 million in 2013 dollars) by Congress that not only
enabled the Commission to resuscitate itself, but also set the important
agenda items for the next two decades. I think if we did that right now
we would find that the SEC has certain core strengths and there are
probably some areas where it probably does not have the strengths it
needs to address the future challenges. For example, the SEC
probably-and rightly so-does not have a good understanding
regarding the appropriate capital requirements for broker-dealer firms,
certainly ones that are a part of a global financial enterprise-the
Federal Reserve or FDIC likely have a better command of this subject.
To the extent this is correct, the SEC's optimal course may well be to
partner with agencies that would be more experienced. In any case, a
special study could examine such a regulatory design question as did the
1963 SEC Special Study.
This dovetails with another exogenous event-the Business
Roundtable decision. 2 The Business Roundtable decision represents an
issue that is larger than the case itself. Today's climate is hostile to
regulation and Business Roundtable can be seen as a manifestation of
that sentiment. A recently published article documents that the holding
in Business Roundtable violated congressional intent as well as
Supreme Court precedents regarding review of agency rulemaking. 3
The decision had nothing to do with the laws the SEC was interpreting.
Instead it is a political decision reflecting what is going on in the nation
as a whole.
There are some areas that are certainly more political than
1.

See generally SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES

MARKETS,
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Doc.

No.

95,

88th

Cong.,

Ist

Sess.

(1963),

available at

http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/tbi/special c.php (divided by chapter).
2. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
3. See James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes:
Confronting the D.C. Circuit's Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 Tex. L. Rev.
1811 (2012).
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others and therefore more likely to attract the interest of those who want
to slow down regulations that are outside the core competencies of the
SEC. For example, what are we going to do about money market funds?
What is the issue with money market funds? I do not think it is the one
we are focusing on. I think the real issue is, do we want to have a
regulated environment for money to be pooled to provide short-term
funds for corporations that need overnight money? That is the
regulatory issue and I do not think the SEC has any particularly unique
insights about this question. So maybe this is an area where the
Commission should cede the turf to the Federal Reserve Board ("Fed"),
or if you want to have a regulator that is closer to business interests, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"). The added benefit
of ceding that territory to a different regulator is that you essentially
make the.Business Roundtable type decision go away because neither
one of those agencies is subject to a requirement of cost-benefit
analysis. Certainly those agencies are subject to due process concerns,
which are mainly takings issues, but they would not get laughed out of
court if they issued a regulation without performing a formal costbenefit analysis. The Fed and the OCC are also not subject to Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs reviews. 4 But recall, when the SEC
brings enforcement actions, it does not have to do cost-benefit analysis.
If the SEC sticks to its knitting and gets down to its core
business, we move forward by focusing on the concerns that deserve
regulation. I do not think we are concerned about credit default swaps
primarily because widows and orphans are going to get defrauded in
those deals. I think we are concerned about credit default swaps mainly
because of what they might do to the national economy. If that is the
case, regulation of credit default swaps ought to be performed by an
agency that is more concerned with macroeconomic issues. This is
especially true for issues surrounding money market funds.
The third exogenous event is the missteps in actions the SEC
has taken on matters that are more clearly within its realm. In the
4. The OIRA may only review the regulations of entities which meet the definition of
"agency" provided in Executive Order No. 12866. See Exec. Order No. 12,886 § 3(b), 3
C.F.R. 638, 641 (1993) (indicating that an "independent regulatory agency" is excluded
from the definition of "agency"). Dodd-Frank amended the definition of "independent
regulatory agency" in 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) to include the OCC. Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 305, 124
Stat. 1376, 1524 (2010). The Federal Reserve is among the agencies defined as an
"independent regulatory agency" in 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5).
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decisions the SEC has lost before the D.C. Circuit, the court has gone
out of its way to say if the SEC had just limited itself to disclosure then
it would have been a lot better.5 So instead of saying that a mutual
fund, to be able to take advantage of some of the safe harbors, has to
require at least three-fourths of its directors to be independent-which
is a laughable proposition in the mutual fund industry by the way-that
maybe what you should have done is require disclosure of the
connections the directors have through the fund's sponsor. For
example, listing the number of fund boards the individual director
serves on within the same family of funds and the collective fees
garnered by that director through such service. 6 This would have been at
least as effective as the three-fourths independent directors' rule.
So one idea emerging from the D.C. Circuit's decisions is that
the SEC should stick to its knitting. A further suggestion is that in
adopting rules the SEC should stage their introduction and scale their
requirements. The former allows information to be gathered to better
assess whether the rule as initially adopted should be more broadly
applied and the latter, would seek to reduce compliance costs for
smaller entities. For example, when the SEC launched the repeal of its
off-board trading bar,7 and also when it considered eliminating the
uptick rule for short selling, 8 it did so on a limited basis that permitted
evidence of costs and benefits to be gathered. Not only did this make
many an investigator delighted with the natural experiment but it also
better informed the course of future regulatory action in these areas.

5. See generally Chamber of Commerce v. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n (Chamber II),
443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chamber of Commerce v. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n
(Chamber I), 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
6. See Chamber of Commerce v. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n (Chamber 1), 412 F.3d 133
(D.C. Cir. 2005).
7. Off-Board Trading Restrictions, Exchange Act Release No. 34-16888, 45 Fed. Reg.
41134 (June 18, 1980) (making it permissible for stocks which were previously confined to
trading only on the New York Stock Exchange to be traded on other exchanges).
8. Former Exchange Act Rule 1Oa-1, the so-called "uptick rule," placed restrictions
on short sales of stocks. See Rules for the Regulation of Short-Selling, Exchange Act
Release No. 1548, 3 Fed. Reg. 213 (Jan. 26, 1938). The uptick rule was briefly waived for
some stocks during a 2004 pilot program implemented by the SEC. See Rule 202T of
Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 55245, 72 Fed. Reg. 6635 (Feb. 12, 2007).
The uptick rule was removed completely in 2007 under the SEC's Rule 201 of Regulation
SHO. See Regulation SHO and Rule 1Oa-1, Exchange Act Release No. 55970, 72 Fed. Reg.
36348 (July 3, 2007). In 2010, the SEC adopted a modified form of the uptick rule known as
the "alternative uptick rule," which only applies to certain stocks. See Amendments to
Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 34-61595, 75 Fed. Reg. 11232 (May 10, 2010).
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These practices will place the SEC in a much better position before the
D.C. Circuit or any other court that might consider a legal challenge to
its regulations.
Another exogenous event is deregulation in the form of Dodd9
Frank, at least as to the securities laws, and most particularly the JOBS
Act. 1 The combination of those two laws took away one of the most
important innovations that has happened in financial market regulation
from the very firms that needed it the most, the independent external
assessment of internal controls in publicly traded firms. Dodd-Frank
made permanent the SEC's timidity in not doing anything with respect
to applying Sarbanes Oxley's Section 404(b)'s auditor's assessment of
internal controls to non-accelerated filers (SEC registrants with a market
cap under $75 million)." The JOBS Act confounded the problem by
increasing the number of record holders required to make a nonreporting company become a reporting company from 500 up to 2000
record holders. 12 As a consequence, everything in Sarbanes-Oxley,
from blackout periods to loans to officers, is keyed off the concept of an
issuer; and because an issuer is defined as a public reporting company,
the Sarbanes-Oxley requirements have been lifted for approximately
eighty-three percent of the former number of reporting companies. So
that is an exogenous event in which suddenly a vast number of
companies are outside the requirements for reporting companies. This
probably now approaches about eight or nine thousand publicly traded
firms that are also going to be outside the realm of private litigation
because their securities may well not be deemed to trade in a market
that is deemed efficient. Therefore, the fraud on the market doctrine
will no longer apply to them.
Many of these companies, that are not technically reporting
companies, will choose nonetheless to go ahead and file an annual
report with the SEC in order to continue trading on the over-the-counter
bulletin board. Otherwise, they are just in a "Pink Sheet Market." The
spreads in the Pink Sheet Market and the cost of capital are not
9. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.
Code).
10. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
306 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
11. Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012).
12. JOBS Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)(A) (2012).
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favorable so we might well expect many voluntary filers. What can the
SEC do about the disappearance of the SOX 404(b) internal control
requirements for so many companies? To be sure, the SEC cannot be so
brazen as to implicitly reverse what Congress did in Dodd-Frank or the
JOBS Act. As a former accountant, I can tell you that the sine qua non
of doing an audit is to make some evaluation and some assessment of
internal controls. You could have the SEC require some enhanced
disclosure, likely collateral to the formal audit opinion letter, regarding
the steps an auditor has taken to assure itself that the firm's records are
sufficiently trustworthy in light of existing internal controls and other
factors to permit the auditor's reliance on the firm's record keeping
system. This would not be the same form of attestation as 404(b), but it
would be better than nothing.
The final exogenous event that I will talk about is enforcement.
There has been a lot of press about the SEC having nominated former
prosecutor Mary Jo White as chairman, and whether this is going to
change things or not change things.1 3 I do not see any change in the
SEC's willingness to start prosecuting individuals rather than entities.
The problem with prosecuting entities and only entities is that the
resulting sanction-a fine-is too easily internalized and simply
becomes another cost of doing business. This means that through its
enforcement efforts the SEC could be seen as merely operating a
turnstile through which businesses may engage in lawless activities so
long as they can pass the enforcement-related costs of those activities
through their operations. To be sure, executives likely do not
consciously contemplate how they are going to violate the law for
maximum gain. But the ability to internalize the burdens of a legal
violation into a firm's pricing structure may well impact the overall
approach to compliance and funding for compliance efforts. Simply put,
if violations can be priced we can expect this will seriously weaken
compliance efforts.
If the SEC wants to start changing its culture and to begin taking
meaningful enforcement actions against individuals then it has to
assume the political risk. The SEC will need to focus its resources on
13. Mary Jo White became the Chairman of the SEC on April 10, 2013. She was
formerly the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York from 1993 to
2002. Roger Runningen & Joshua Gallu, Obama Names Former ProsecutorMary Jo White
as SEC Chairman, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 24, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0124/obama-set-to-name-white-to-sec-cordray-to-lead-consumer-bureau.html.
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fewer cases. The SEC is likely to lose a lot more cases than they lose
right now. And, the SEC will collect a lot less money. Indeed, Robert
Khuzami, the outgoing enforcement chief, has justified the SEC's
current enforcement practices by stating that the SEC brings a lot of
cases and they've been going up. He argues that if the SEC brought
fewer cases, it would collect less money for injured investors. 1 4 The
SEC has a pretty good win-loss record, he would say. So, he says that
unless you want to flip that around and bring fewer cases, recover less
money, and lose some cases along the way, he doesn't think the SEC
should want to change these results. This issue is a tough political issue
for the new SEC Chairwoman. Note, the difficulty of changing course is
that the perceived benefit-enhanced deterrence against executives and
other key employees-is not nearly as tangible and hence observable as
wins and losses or penalties recovered. In a society that assesses
quantitatively the benefits of everything, this is a politically hazardous
course. At the same time, there is a case to be made that it is corrosive
to the SEC to perpetuate the status quo in which the individuals most
responsible for legal violations are not held personally accountable for
their actions. Eventually, this perception also taints the entire agency
with the threat of leading to further marginalization.
There are multiple challenges that confront the SEC. But the
largest of the challenges awaiting it are to define its mission, so that it is
central to those challenges and not pushed to the margins by the
exogenous events set forth here. Rather than counseling brave new
initiatives, the discussion here suggests some stepping back and some
following a new path. Most certainly continuing the past trajectory will
only lead to continued decline and deprive America of a potentially
effective and devoted agency.
The final point is that if you care about the SEC-and I think
most of us in the room do care about having our markets be regulated
and fair-and you want to have a good cop on the block, then you must
try to stop the corrosion that is in the public eye right now, namely, that
the big guys, the responsible people, never are held accountable. The
worst outcome would be a continued public perception that paying
corporate fines to the SEC for law breaking is just one more cost of
14. See Robert S. Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n,
Testimony on "Examining the Settlement Practices of U.S. Financial Regulators" (May 17,
2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2012/ts051712rk.htm.
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doing business. Eventually, that is going to taint the whole agency and
we will have further marginalization and the agency will not be able to
redeem itself. The SEC needs to change.

